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ABSTRACT Participatory approaches to development have been implemented increasingly. One
form is theWorld Bank’s community-driven development ( CDD) programme. Participation has,
also, becomeincreasingly securitised since2001. One instanceof thesetrendswastheK apit-Bisig
Laban sa K ahirapan ( KALAHI) project in the Philippines. This paper examines the implemen-
tation of CDD and the problems of its securitisation, using the Philippines as a case study. A
compositeconceptual framework isadvanced that draws upon the international analyses of devel-
opment. Adapting the concepts of securitisation and de-politicisation, it argues that a new hege-
monic-development framework has appeared: the Securitised-Washington consensus. The
analysis assesses these trends through the examples of KALAHI and Philippine politics and eco-
nomics. I t suggests that securitised CDD projects result in token eﬀ orts at political reform and
poverty alleviation that often are contradicted by counter-trends towards development decline
and militarisation. Unless these deep-rooted problems are confronted, localised participation is
likely to remain ineﬀ ectual.
K EY WORDS: Development, security, participation, politics, economics, Philippines
Participatory approaches to development and poverty alleviation have been
implemented in many places. The turn to participation reflected broader trends
within oﬃ cial development policy towards a focus on ‘‘governance’’ and poverty in
the second half of the 1990s. One of the most extensive participatory approaches is
the World Bank’s community-driven development (CDD) programme. CDD
projects have been established across the developing world, including within
Southeast Asia (M oxham, 2005; Rao and Ibanez, 2005; World Bank, 2005a).
At the same time as CDD projects have been implemented, there has been an
increasing connection between security considerations by states and participatory
development. While the emergence of participatory approaches to development has
been the topic of considerable analysis, there have, however, been further evolutions
in participation policy since the early 2000s (Cooke and K othari, 2001; Hickey and
M ohan, 2004). M ost notable was the trend towards its ‘‘securitisation’’ (see Buzan
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et al., 1998). There have been attempts to utilise participatory processes to help
legitimise the state in the eyes of impoverished populations. Such attempts have
explicitly been implemented to counteract threats to the state from insurgencies and
political mobilisation by impoverished populations.
An important example of CDD projects is the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan
(link arms against poverty) Comprehensive Delivery of Social Services (K ALAHI-
CIDSS) project in the Philippines. The Philippines is a highly instructive case of
where such securitisation processes have occurred. Nominally a middle-income
economy, thePhilippines hasexperienced consistently low levelsof economic growth
in comparison with other economies in East and Southeast Asia. I t exhibits high
levels of poverty and inequality. Despite being a constitutional democracy, the
Philippine polity is widely regarded as exclusionary and elite-dominated. There are
two long-running insurgencies and numerous militant social movements. K ALAHI
emerged in the aftermath of mass protests that removed the government of Joseph
Estrada as president in 2001. The new government of President Gloria M acapagal
Arroyo sought to represent itself as committed to reducing poverty and corruption.
I t also became, paradoxically perhaps, committed to strongly militaristic policies
aimed at countering threats to the state.
Accordingly, this paper examines the implementation of CDD and the problems
of its ‘‘securitisation,’’ using thePhilippinesasa casestudy. I t examines international
changes in development policy and examines how these have been reflected on the
national scale. Are local attempts at participatory development and poverty
alleviation compatible with the increasing securitisation of development policy?
Do local approaches to participation have substantive impacts on poverty and
political reform in the absence of comparable macro-level changes? Finally, can
local-scale approaches employed by regimes obscure the actuality of continued
political and economic stagnation or decline at the national scale?
The methods and conceptual approach flow from these questions. First, a
composite conceptual framework is advanced that draws upon the international-
scale political and economic analyses of development advanced by Fine et al. (2001).
The global framework is combined with an analysis of the uneven eﬀ ects of these
changes on the regional and national scales, drawing upon Chang (2006) and K iely
(2007). Adapting the concept of securitisation from the work of Buzan and his
colleagues (1998) and Hay’s (2007) notion of depoliticisation, it posits an original
view of the historical evolution of hegemonic development policy by identifying the
emergence of a ‘‘securitised’’ Washington Consensus (WC). Second, the global-scale
analysis is then applied to the recent political and economic evolution of the
Philippine case study. Third, the analysis of the local- and national-scale processes
directly associated with K ALAHI is derived from two sources. On the one hand,
there is a textual analysis of the main policy documents, including the implementing
agencies’ own mid-term reviews. On the other hand, the data are triangulated with a
qualitative analysis of interviews and local focus groups, using a narrative structure
technique (Creswell, 2007: 55). The interviews are with implementers and oﬃ cials
associated with the K ALAHI project. The two focus groups consisted of six self-
selected and unpaid project volunteers from two localities on the Bontoc peninsula,
in Quezon province. The volunteers are members of local municipalities who have
had varying levels of engagement with the projects. The paper commences with a
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discussion of the international processes, before moving to the national- and local-
scale analyses.
Securitising the Washington Consensus
Arguably, there have been three periods of evolution of internationally hegemonic
development policy over the last 30 years (Table 1). Although declared to be ‘‘over’’
by then British Prime M inister Gordon Brown (cited in The Wall Street Journal, 3
April 2009), each of these phases revolves around diﬀ erent forms of the WC. CDD
projects like K ALAHI need to be understood in the context of the second and third
phases of the WC.
The original WC can be traced to the period of restructuring and crisis
management in the 1980s in Latin America and many other developing and
transition economies (Williamson, 1989; Naim, 1999). There were limited outcomes
and successes from the WC’s implementation. The resulting second phase of the
‘‘post-Washington consensus’’ (PWC) commenced in themid-1990s. ThePWC wasa
response to the perceived limits of earlier reforms, yet the various measures
contained in the PWC did not redress the deleterious role that multilateral
supervision had often entailed. Rather, an emphasis was placed on reforming state
institutions as the foundation upon which eﬃ cient markets and economic growth
could emerge (seeFine, 2001; Fine et al., 2001). Theconceptual foundation such as
it was  was a methodological-individualist framework. I t tended to lead to
proposals based on depoliticised and managerial approaches, such as building social
capital (see Harriss, 2002). The PWC framework eventually adopted various forms
of national- and local-level participation (such as seen in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers) and process (such as participatory learning and action; see World
Bank, 1996).
The World Bank’s CDD programme emerged in this context. CDD was one
aspect of institutional reform that had the goal of using local participation to
allocate the delivery of services to impoverished populations (Dongier et al., 2002;
Wong and Guggenheim, 2004). The rationale focused on how participation could
counter clientelism and the distortions in resource allocation (World Bank, 2004).
These analyses, however, were not focused on how these processes can have deep
historical roots or be reflections of the existence of exploitative social classes. The
solutions posed, therefore, were modest institutional reforms, mostly at the level of
local government. CDD was an attempt to incorporate many of the practices and
policies of participation into desired policies.
Arguably, these limits to CDD and the PWC more generally were reflections of
processes implicit in the depoliticisation and centralisation political and economic
policy making that has occurred through all the phases of the WC (Hay, 2007: 92-
152). In the contemporary world, many policy-making bodies now openly boast that
many spheres of decision making have been largely removed from the responsibility
of democratic legislatures. The ideational and conceptual foundation for thiswas the
increased intellectual hegemony of public choice theory. Public choice rationalised
the removal of policy making from ‘‘self-interested’’ political actors. In addition, the
idea of globalisation  and in particular the pressure of international competition
and financial markets  was repeatedly used to legitimise narrowing the scope of
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policy-making space. For Hay (2007), the most notable example of depoliticisation
and centralisation was the trend towards accepting central bank independence by
national governments. Governmentsceded control of interest ratesand other aspects
of monetary policy by accepting the ideological-based claims about distortions
imposed by the electoral cycle on economic policy making. These decisions are now
increasingly made by private and semi-public central bank boards.
The PWC and CDD need to be understood in the context of processes of
depoliticisation and centralisation. For multilateral supervisory bodies, the principal
form of depoliticisation they promoted was ‘‘good governance’’ (World Bank, 2007).
Core decisions on development were increasingly removed from spheres of public
debate and presented as immutable: these were the core economic principles of the
WC. M eanwhile, secondary aspectsof local institutionsand culturebecamethefocus
of institutional reform. First, the main obstacle to development and in particular
the purported benefits of economic liberalisation  was again identified as the
absence of a suitably modernised state (Berger and Beeson, 1998). To the extent that
issues of politics were raised within the PWC and CDD, they focused on forms of
exclusionary power (such as clientelism), rather than deep-rooted and historical
issues of exploitative class relations and power. Second, and more importantly, both
CDD and the PWC set specific boundaries around the spheres of participation and
the degree to which fundamental aspects of development policy could be challenged.
An overall framework of the main aspects of liberalisation and structural reform,
which would be managed by multilateral agencies, central banks and planning
agencies, was accepted. Hence, conditionality associated with multilateral lending
meant the national and local control of policy remained severely constrained ‘‘if we
understand ownership in this regard to mean the freedom of a government to
formulate and implement its own economic development policy’’ (Pender, 2001:
410). In terms of outcomes, Porter and Craig (2004: 387) note that the PWC’s
‘‘rhetorical aspirations to social ‘inclusivity’ haveso far over-reached empirical gains
for the poor.’’
Therehasbeen an additional third phase in theevolution of theWC. Development
policy became (re)securitised after 2001 and emerged as the Securitised Washington
Consensus (SWC). The SWC accepted the basis of the main themes of the WC and
PWC concerning economic management and governance. I t further incorporated
them, however, into security-based strategies protecting political elites. As Higgott
(2004) notes, development policy had almost always overlapped with security
concerns. What has happened since 2001 is a more explicit set of linkages involving
multilateral and bilateral donors and recipient states. By 2003, the PWC’s
governance framework had already been given an additional emphasis on resolving
conflicts (see World Bank, 2003). The changes at the World Bank commenced under
James Wolfensohn, appointed during Bill Clinton’s presidency, and were con-
solidated by Paul Wolfowitz and his successor Robert Zoellick, both taking oﬃ ce
during the George W. Bush presidency in the USA.
Securitisation is a process whereby threats and responses are constructed in public
discourse ‘‘speech acts’’ by state-based political and military elites (Buzan et al.,
1998: 22). The perception of threats from individuals, groups or issues becomes a
perception of ‘‘existential threats’’ to the survival of ‘‘referent objects.’’ These
referent objects are usually nation-states and their populations. L inkage to the
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processes of depoliticisation and centralisation occur when issues become securitised
in public discourse. The existence of a ‘‘threat’’ means problems can cease ‘‘to be
part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations . . .’’
(Buzan et al., 1998: 23). In other words, discourses about threats to survival or
emergencies are employed to remove issues from the domain of deliberation into a
sphere of action by elite-based state agencies with reduced accountability.
Under the SWC, development policy has become even more explicitly interlinked
with issues of state viability and security. A substantive discursive apparatus about
fragile, weak and failed states has emerged. Combined military and development
external intervention became justified on the basis of the security threats such states
and actors (existential threats) posed to thedeveloped world and local elites (referent
objects). Zoellick (2008) has provided a concise summation of the SWC that refers
explicitly to ‘‘securing development.’’ The main themes of the PWC  state
legitimacy and not ‘‘crowding out’’ the private sector are framed within an explicit
focus of combined military and development intervention. For Zoellick, the
‘‘military arm [however] is but one tool, which must be integrated with political
and economic capabilities to be successful.’’ Within the SWC as with the PWC 
allusions to ‘‘the need to recognise local political economy and taking into account
the relationships between power and wealth in society’’ are made, yet there are no
substantial proscriptions for their resolution (Zoellick, 2008: 77-8). Therefore,
development is constructed as a component sphere of security. I t is a composite of
established policy proscriptions aimed at maintaining the legitimacy of states. In as
much as there is attention paid to the politics of conflicts, it remains subordinated to
the security of existing states and elites.
However, these analyses of securitisation and depoliticisation/centralisation
require another level of analysis. While Buzan et al. (1998) and Hay (2007) focus
on how these processes operate, they are less clear about why these trends have
emerged in particular historical contexts. Both processes need to be situated in a
framework of international and national processes of capital accumulation, class
relations and forms of state regime.
The processes of depoliticisation and securitisation implicit in all WC phases have
occurred in the context of an international restructuring of capital since the 1970s.
On theonehand, therehasbeen the restructuring and a reduction in the institutional
strength of labour within the developed capitalist economies. Neo-liberalism
prevented the further expansion of social protection and collective bargaining
(Harvey, 2005). On the other hand, diﬀ erentiation took place across the developing
economies. In general, the import-substitution-based and interventionist policies of
economic development that predominated after decolonisation gave way to the WC.
The notion, however, that lower production costs across the developing countries
would give them opportunities to capture export markets and beneficial inflows of
foreign direct investment (FDI), proved to be somewhat illusionary. Established
developed-country industries and firms tended to utilise various means advantages
in technology, access to finance, useof research and development and control of new
markets to block most new entrants (K iely, 2007: 18-19). The process, however,
was uneven, with East Asia being the main region of developing economies that
registered gains through achieving some level of autonomy from WC proscriptions.
Select East Asian economies used a combination of agrarian reform, state
52 B. Reid
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intervention to ‘‘govern the market’’ and access to developed-economy markets to
achieve consistent growth in income (Chang, 2006). M ore recently, the second tier of
high-growth capitalist economies in Southeast Asia implemented similar policies that
deviated in important but less substantive ways from the standard WC measures.
What was the likelihood that the SWC would provide theconditions necessary for
the replication of such processes in other developing nation-states? Historically, of
course, many instances of successful industrial-capitalist development involved
heavily securitised states. For the most part, the East Asian newly industrialised
economies were national-security states in which there was considerable repression.
South K orea’s experience of state-led development represents an ‘‘ideal type’’ of the
process (K im, 2003). The existence of authoritarian and security-state regimes,
however, has not historically automatically led to successful development outcomes.
Rather, more importance needs to be placed on how the state can develop suﬃ cient
autonomy (often legitimised by ‘‘existential threats’’) to direct capital and labour
into processes entailing expanded accumulation and growth (see Hamilton, 1989).
Where the state remains captive to class and social forces that are inimical to
accumulation and growth, securitisation may be likely to reinforce this power and
act as a block to development.
Of course, thecrisis in theworld economy that began in 2008 raises thequestion of
whether the SWC itself will soon be redundant as there is the appearance of an
increasing rejection of neo-liberalism amongst developed-country policy elites. Bello
(2008), for instance, has suggested some break has occurred but ‘‘that how decisive
and definitive the break with neoliberalism will be’’ remains unclear. So far the
evidence is not very strong. While clearly state intervention and targeted
expenditures have increased, it is not really such a substantive break with neo-
liberalism. For instance, despite the reduced ‘‘role of the state’’ rhetoric, state
expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) never really declined
across the 1980s and 1990s. After rising from 16% in 1970 to 18.1% in 1981, they
stayed at an average level of 17.5% until 2001 before rising again to over 18% in
2005 (World Bank, 2008). While the bout of post-2008 crisis amelioration
expenditure rises will increase this further, it is important to recognise how this
expenditure is being used. This is for bank liquidity rather than expansionary
expenditure and is entirely in line with the prescribed role for central banks. The
actual expansionary measures and quantitative easing being employed in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have led to
intensified pressures to reduce public expenditure as it finances bank and credit
restructuring. In the developing world, there has been a further tightening of
conditionalities by multilateral agencies (Hailu, 2009). While the continued shift of
economic power in favour of the larger middle-income economies of China, Russia,
India and Brazil may give scope for more support for diﬀ erent policy approaches, in
countries like the Philippines there is likely to be a tightening of the SWC.
In sum, the SWC has attempted to assimilate the implications of some of these
experiences into the notion of ‘‘governance,’’ yet what was appropriated was an
emphasis on forms of securitised and institutional governance without their deeper
content. Greater weight wasplaced on state legitimacy and theneed for governments
to integrate development within a security framework. The economic growth and
accumulation strategies that underpinned the model remained the same and largely
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ineﬀ ective approaches that continued to lead to development failures. There was no
recognition that social, institutional and class impediments have to be substantially
altered or removed.
Poverty, Politics and Security in the Philippines
The Philippines provides a very good vantage point for assessing the impacts of the
SWC on development. Recognised as a ‘‘testing ground for Anglo-American
approaches to development,’’ the Philippines exhibited higher levels of poverty and
inequality in comparison with other East Asian states (M ontes and Lim, 1996: 342).
I t became a testing ground for the SWC as it has for other policy packages. The
relationship between international processes and national trends/regimes is
illustrated in Table 2.
I t iswidely recognised that thehistorical originsof thePhilippinestatefrom thelate
nineteenth century entrenched high levels of inequality. US colonisation relied upon
the support of and consolidated the power of monopolistic landowning classes
(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 134-47; Reid, 2000). Subsequently, national
development policy-making trendshavetended to closely followed recommendations
from the USA. These forces assumed substantive hegemony over the state and
maintained their support through ‘‘machinepolitics’’ and violence (Sidel, 1999). Yet,
asTable2 illustrates, therewerevariations in thesetrends. In themain period of post-
war development, between 1948 and 1962, import substitution policiesand moderate
agrarian reform resulted in increased levels of industrialisation. At the same time, a
closesecurity relationship wasestablished whereby theUSA becametheguarantor of
security for the elite against popular social movements and insurgencies (Reid,
2006b). The form of state and development that emerged represented a ‘‘soggy’’
security state. Relationships of power remained dominated by family based alliances
of landowning classes. Exclusionary violencewaspartly oﬀ set by resettlement of poor
populations and marginal increases in urban-based import-substituting industry.
These relationships altered again in the early 1960s. Unlike K orea, the import-
substitution industries never matured to the level whereby they could become
internationally competitive. This was in large part owing to the ad hoc nature of
limited land reform processes. The substantive concentrations of land ownership
meant agricultural prices remained high and rents accruing landowners were largely
not deployed in productive investments. The political power of these large
landowners also was able to reassert itself when the threat of communist insurgency
declined in the latter half of the1950s. ThePhilippinestate, therefore, never wasable
to develop theautonomy over development policy making of theK orean stateand in
a more limited way other newly-industrialised economies (NIEs) (Reid, 2000). The
consequence was the second phase of combining openness with structuralism, as
illustrated in Table 2. The result was that import controls were dismantled in the
1960s in favour of an emphasis on export agriculture and landowner interests
(Rivera, 1994). When such existential threatsdeclined as they did between theearly
1950s and the 1970s  so elite policy makers weakened social reform measures
(Ofreneo, 1980). The USA the security patrons of the Philippine state and elite 
took no action to counter these changes. The results were economic stagnation,
a security-based state and an enduring pattern of unequal and exclusionary rule.
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The situation deteriorated in the 1970s and 1980s with a period of dictatorship.
First, there was dictatorial rule between 1972 and 1986 by Ferdinand M arcos.
M arcos’ rule allowed a limited period of development and expansion to occur in the
economy. As indicated in Table 2, it adopted the main multilateral-policy measures
of the time of limited structuralism and limited ‘‘openness’’ (export production). The
economic growth of the time was, however, heavily dependent on resource
discounting and external multilateral finance (Boyce, 1993). Substantial M aoist
and ethno-nationalist insurgencies also emerged. By the early 1980s the Philippines
became one of the most aﬀ ected economies of the debt crisis, with per capita income
falling by over 9% in both 1984 and 1985 (World Bank, 2008). The crisis eventually
led to the M arcos dictatorship’s collapse in 1986.
Second, the restoration of formal democratic rule under Cory Aquino between
1986 and 1996 in part under pressure from political mass mobilisation did not
substantially alter exclusionary political processes (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005:
193-256). Aquino adopted a policy of ‘‘honest debtor’’ by 1987 that guaranteed that
the Philippines became one of the most enthusiastic adherents to WC policies (Table
2). This was partly because a large part of the elected congress and senate was still
dominated by select political clans (Coronel et al., 2004). The restoration of
democracy was not therefore accompanied by substantive improvements in
developmental outcomes. In the ideational sphere, there was subservience to
multilateral-sponsored macro-economic and development strategy and concepts
implicit in the WC. A contraction in gross national income (GNI) in 1981-82, as a
result of the debt crisis, commenced a process of structural adjustment programmes.
The Aquino regime adopted a ‘‘model debtor’’ policy in 1987 automatically
mandating appropriation for debt servicing from the national budget. Questionable
interpretations of the experiences of the other developing East and Southeast Asian
economy experiences were used to justify a range of liberalisation measures (Bello
et al., 2004: 14). Finally, a considerable level of militarisation was maintained in
response to the existence of two main armed insurgencies (Reid, 2006b).
As a result, varying levels of disenchantment as early as the 1992 presidential
elections  were expressed by the electorate with votes for ‘‘outsider’’ candidates.
This was partially reflected in the election of Fidel Ramos as president (Tornquist,
1993). Ramos’ form of governing combined a ‘‘technocratic’’ approach to
implementing the WC tempered by granting financial concession to the entrenched
political clans. Adopting policy rhetoric of making the Philippines a ‘‘newly-
industrialised country’’ by 2000, he instead implemented extensive forms of the WC.
Investment and import-liberalisation and privatisation ensued and there were some
years of economic growth between 1993 and 1997 (Reid, 2000). The economic crisis
of 1997 and 1998, however, undermined these gains. Towards the end of his term
there was also experimentation with aspects of the PWC (Table 2). These included
more participatory measures in the agrarian reform sector, convening a Sustainable
Development Commission; and introducing a legislated Social Reform Initiative
(Reid, 2005).
However, the main consequence of the Ramos years was further disenchantment
with political processes. One response was the election of former movie celebrity
Joseph Estrada as president in 1998 on the basis of ‘‘pro-poor’’ rhetoric. The
contours of these policies remained within the rhetoric of the PWC’s commitment to
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poverty alleviation and governance. His victory was significant though in that his
main base of support was in the poorer ‘‘level D and E’’ sectors (those classified as
living below income-poverty thresholds in various regionsof thePhilippines) (David,
2001; SWS, various years). Expectations over social reform were quickly frustrated
as Estrada largely failed to implement any. His attempts at Comprehensive and
Integrated Delivery of Social Services and anti-poverty programmes consisted of
clientelist disbursements (Bautista, 2002: 159). Estrada was ousted by a mass
uprising in 2001 after the disintegration of his cabinet and was replaced by Vice-
President Gloria M acapagal-Arroyo (Reid, 2001).
Arroyo represented the return of the main political clans to the main executive
oﬃ ce, having been a senator and the daughter of a former president. In the context
of replacing a government with considerable support from the poor, her regime
inherited a diﬃ cult situation. The Philippines remained bound by the contradictions
that had predominated since the early 1960s. There were high levels of poverty and
development failure, as a survey of the World Bank’s (2008) development indicators
between 1962 and Arroyo’s assumption of oﬃ ce in 2001 demonstrates.
. In 1962, the Philippine GNI per capita was US$220, behind only Japan
(US$1060) and Singapore (US$450) and twice that of K orea (US$110). By 2001,
the GNI per capita was only US$1050 in the Philippines compared with
US$10,580 for K orea, while China (US$1000) was on the brink of overtaking it
(World Bank, 2008).
. GDP and GDP per capita average annual growth rates in the Philippines had
only been 5% and 1.2%, compared with 6.8% and 3.9% for East Asia between
1962 and 2001(World Bank, 2008).
. The proportion of the workforce employed in industry in the Philippines
remained static at 15-16% across the whole period (World Bank, 2008).
. The Philippines’ level of income inequality was extremely high and increasing: in
1985, the Gini index was 40.63 and, by 2000, it was 46.16. This was higher than
other Southeast and East Asian states, such as K orea (31.59) and Singapore
(42.46) in 1998 (World Bank, 2008).
. The ratio of top 10 to lowest 10 deciles of income earners rose from 13 in 1985 to
almost 16 in 2000 (World Bank, 2008).
. Formal measures of extreme poverty using US$1 a day income indicate that
59.1% of families subsisted below this level in 1990 and 42.0% in 1994. This
fell to a low of 35.6% in 1997, before rising again to 45.4% in 2000 (Asian
Development Bank (ADB), 2003: 29). National poverty threshold headcounts
indicate that there was a decrease from 49.2% in 1985 to 36.9% in 1997, before
falling to 33% in 2000 (National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB),
2008).
There was, therefore, a combination of low economic growth, rising inequality
and still-high levels of income poverty. There was also considerable low-intensity
conflict occurring, often in heavily impoverished regions. Therefore, it was in this
historical context that Arroyo would implement a poverty programme inspired by
the SWC. Would Arroyo’s government continue or alter these patterns and
processes?
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Securitised Community Development
The Arroyo government’s response to these high levels of poverty was to implement
policies strongly in line with the SWC (Table 2). The K ALAHI framework was
developed to pursue a range of poverty alleviation and reduction measures. Within
this, a CDD poverty alleviation project was formulated with a highly securitised
rationale and focus.
On the one hand, the Arroyo regime presented itself as a reforming government
that was the product of the anti-corruption mass mobilisations that ousted Estrada
in favour of ‘‘good governance.’’ Various key statements by Arroyo (2002; 2004)
presented the regime as a modernising faction promoting economic growth and
poverty reduction. Some social democratic parties and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) werealso (and somestill remain) both supportersof thegovernment in
the Congress and in sub-national level administrations or were appointed to the
cabinet (Reid, 2003; Reid, 2008). On the other hand, the regime retained a strongly-
securitised approach to social and political mobilisations and secessionist threats. I ts
political programme was presented as combating existential threats in the form of
both ‘‘lawlessness’’ (essentially insurgencies and popular social movements) and
patrimonialism within society, state and culture. While Arroyo’s claimed identity
was as part of a ‘‘reforming centre bloc,’’ in practice, it did little to alter the main
patterns of economic and political processes (Arroyo, 2004).
Thissecuritised approach to development wasalso in continuity with thePhilippine
state and elite’s alliance with the USA. As explained elsewhere (Reid, 2006b), the
restoration of formal democracy in 1986 did not immediately impact on thepresence
of the US military in the country. By theearly 1990s, however, with the expiry of the
post-war agreement on US bases, the presence of foreign troops eﬀ ectively ended.
Various attempts were made by Ramos and Estrada to formalise a US military
presence via a Visiting Forces Agreement but there was considerable public
opposition. Arroyo’s government has followed a similar pattern of carefully
expanding co-operation, while placating public opinion. The regime quietly joined
the Bush administration’s so-called coalition of the willing and deployed troops to
Iraq in 2004. These troopswereremoved after thekidnapping of a Philippinecivilian
worker and therealisation of theconsiderablethreat posed to thousandsof Philippine
nationalsworking in theGulf region. Theregimehas, however, continued to seek US
support for counter-insurgency measures, especially in M indanao. I t hasoccasionally
used purported but specious claims of linkages between theM oro Islamic L iberation
Front and Jihadist groups to obtain USsupport for its counter-insurgency measures.
These emphases on governance, poverty and security by the Arroyo government
came together in its K ALAHI strategy, designed in conjunction with the World
Bank and select development NGOs, via the President’s National Anti-Poverty
Commission (NAPC). Conscious of the need to be seen to be responding to issues of
poverty, Arroyo purportedly revived the NAPC which had existed since the end of
Ramos’ presidency in 2001 and appointed a new set of representatives (interview,
Soliman, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, 2001-05; Reid,
2008). The broader K ALAHI ‘‘strategy’’ consequently emerged in 2002 as a diﬀ use
collection of overlapping projects (Table 3). The K ALAHI-CIDSS CDD project
was the most extensive, with the largest number of intended beneficiaries and was
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labelled as the government’s ‘‘flagship project’’ for poverty alleviation (Arroyo,
2004). The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)  a weak
department with little previous role in development policy was assigned the task of
implementing the project across the 40 poorest provinces in the Philippines over six
years (2002-08). The World Bank provided a US$100 million loan to finance the
K ALAHI-CIDSS project, while the Philippine national government contributed
US$80 million and the 182 municipal-level local government units (LGUs) provided
a further US$20 million.
There were two stated rationales for K ALAHI. First, Arroyo was able to present
the regime as countering the influence of clientelist politics on the local scale. The
aim was to direct funds for service provision through CDD. The relationships of
‘‘bossism’’/machine politics discussed above are also expressed on the local scale.
There is often arbitrary distribution of discretionary funds by elected oﬃ cials
(interview, 18 July 2006, A. Parker, Senior Economist, World Bank, Philippines;
interview, Soliman). Decentralisation through the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991 established an even more direct allocation of funds to LGUs. M ayors were
given considerable control over Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) for the use in
local service provision (interview, Soliman). Considerable controversy surrounded
the use of IRAs, with estimates of 60% of funds being captured through familial
channels or used for vote buying (Coronel et al., 2004: 175). What K ALAHI
proposed was that provisions that existed in the LGC needed to be implemented
more thoroughly via nationally supported CDD initiatives. The core participatory
component came through the convening of five barangay (village) assemblies of all
adult constituents to deliberate upon and vote on projects (DSWD, n.d.). The
rationale was to remove decisions on expenditures from mayors’ discretion in favour
of projects directly identified by barangay assemblies.
Second, K ALAHI wasexplicitly rationalised aspart of a security strategy by Arroyo
against ‘‘lawless elements.’’ Deputy Presidential Assistant for M indanao, Virgilio
Leyretana (2003), defined K ALAHI as an ‘‘indispensible mechanism against poverty
and insurgency.’’ Leyretana explained that the government viewed poverty in the
Philippines in what he calls ‘‘decadent’’ rural areas asdirectly linked to the existence
of ‘‘parasitic insurgents and secessionist groups.’’ A major aim of K ALAHI was to
increase service provision in impoverished rural areas to reduce the base for the
‘‘communist/terrorist/secessionists.’’ Leyretana (2003) acknowledged that it was also
aspects of the Philippine polity that allowed the insurgencies to continue: the ‘‘soft
state’’ meant the insurgencies were ‘‘waging all-out propaganda discrediting our
government before the people. The government is susceptible and vulnerable due to
existing major flaws and inadequacies which breed conditions: graft and corruption.’’
Thecausesof insurgency are‘‘dueto thecommission of injusticesand abusesby certain
government functionaries, M ilitary, Police and para-military personnel, as well as by
capitalists, landlords and imperialists.’’ Leyretana added: ‘‘The united eﬀorts of
government and civil society’’ are required to generate reform and poverty reduction.
Two points become apparent. First, the process of securitisation linked to the
regime’s legitimacy and power  is explicit. The primary ‘‘existential threat’’ was
the insurgencies. The imperative for poverty alleviation wasestablished to reduce the
capacity of insurgent groups to build support amongst thepoor. Second, there wasa
contradiction, though, in that the Philippine polity was based on the processes that
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cause high levels of poverty. While the regime represented itself as united with ‘‘civil
society,’’ it simultaneously excluded the political forces and social movements that it
identified as associated with the ‘‘parasitic insurgencies.’’
KALAHI ’S Poverty and Governance Impacts
Not surprisingly, given the contradictions of the explicitly securitised rationale of
K ALAHI, its impacts on governance and development in its target areas have been
marginal. There was simultaneously a deterioration in the political situation with
widespread extra-judicial killings occurring  and an increase in income poverty
levels overall. Before discussing the deterioration in the national situation, this
section examinessomeof the limitsof K ALAHI itself, including: its limited national-
scalecoverage; local impactson poverty; evidence of itseﬀ ects on political processes;
and relationship to violence and security.
National-scale Coverage
From the beginning, the limits of K ALAHI were evident in the scale and financing
of the project. Initially the project appeared to have extensive coverage. I t included
just over 183 (12.1%) of 1510 municipalities nationally, in the 42 poorest provinces,
with the most extensive areas being in the southern areas of the Visayas and
M indanao (World Bank, 2005a; World Bank, 2005b). While it is diﬃ cult to
determine the number of beneficiaries, funds were dispersed to barangays and there
were approximately 10.5 million people residing in project areas. By this estimate,
however, the intended K ALHI-CIDSS beneficiaries only comprised around one-
third of the total impoverished population.
Comparing state expenditure levels and the proportion that K ALAHI received
raisesfurther doubtsregarding theextent of impact. Thefundingallocationsfrom both
the Philippine central government and the World Bank were US$180 million. On
average, thisrepresented just 0.35% of thetotal Philippinepublicdispersalsover thesix
years. Government expenditure on social services as a whole actually declined during
the initial three years of the project (National Economic Development Authority,
2007). Assuming that the LGUs were able to meet their own contributions, the per
capitaexpenditurefor each person within themunicipalitiescovered by theproject was
just US$19.70. Obviously, the impact of such meagreexpenditureswould be limited.
Local Impacts on Poverty
These limitations in financing and coverage were largely confirmed by local-scale
analysis. The following discussion draws on: World Bank and DSWD documents; a
village focus group (VFG) and a town focus group (TFG) of unpaid K ALAHI
volunteers in Bondoc peninsular, Quezon province, and interviews with DSWD
project staﬀ . The focus groups and interviews were conducted in July 2006. These
data led to three conclusions.
First, comments from key informants and focus groups suggested that when
barangay assemblies met they emphasised projects that were seen as benefiting the
largest cross-section of participants rather than being targeted to the poor. They
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tended to adopt a limited range of proposals. Nationally, the largest share comprises
roads and water systems, representing 52.8% of the total projects and 73.9% of
funds. Schools, day care and health stations represent a further 23.9% of projects.
Harvesting (usually milling) was the only other significant category, comprising
5.7% of projects (DSWD, 2007). The VFG revealed that most members of this
particular barangay assembly accepted two ‘‘needs’’ as most evident: transport and
education. They accepted that there was some prompting by the DSWD staﬀ in
deciding these priorities. The assemblies, therefore, adopted proposals for a school
and a new road. The rationale for the road was that it would reduce transport costs
for products (roots and coconuts) by one-fifth, as well as providing other benefits.
There was also some inter-generational allocation of resources as a school was built.
Benefits were also expressed in terms of how this helped parents, who no longer had
to pay for transport costs and had their children close by.
Similarly, the TFG in the larger town of M ulanay emphasised that there was a
strong push for projects that benefited what was considered to be the ‘‘whole
community.’’ Hence, a major sub-project was the construction of a retainer wall at
the town’s ocean shoreline to mitigate flooding. The other project supported was a
day-care centre for children. This was mostly explained as allowing adults to pursue
paid work, with the centre operating at a very low price. The national data and local
reflection emphasise a pattern of local-scale infrastructure projects considered to
have a ‘‘community-wide’’ impact, supplemented by education and child-centred
facilities. I t is unclear how specifically excluded and impoverished groups within the
poorer communities would specifically benefit from these activities. This failure to
understand the impacts for certain sub-groups and how funds could be targeted to
them has been criticised (Interview, C. Belangel, Deputy ExecutiveDirector, CODE-
NGO, 17 July 2006).
Second, project implementers and local volunteers drew similar conclusions about
theeﬃ cacy of both theoutcomesand processes. TheDSWD staﬀ mainly emphasised
the cost and targeting benefits of the participatory process. The review documents
and Bank and DSWD staﬀ highlighted the cost advantages of the scheme, claiming
an internal rate of return of 21% (Gonzales, 2006; World Bank, 2005a). K ALAHI
does things ‘‘better, faster and cheaper’’ according to the World Bank (interview,
Parker). I t was claimed that a combination of factors enables this. The K ALAHI ’s
barangay assembliesand volunteer committeesweredesigned to increase thescrutiny
of elected oﬃ cials. Thiswassaid to reducethemisuseof discretionary funds intended
for works and services by mayors. Substantial use of volunteer labour also allowed
for cost reductions in procurement and transport.
Third, project volunteers in both the VFG and TFG claimed ownership and
eﬃ ciency in the projects. I t was clear that there was a sense of ownership over the
infrastructure. VFG and TFG members emphasised the value of the school
buildings, day-care centre, road and retaining wall that had been built with
K ALAHI funds. They also concurred that the K ALAHI process had allowed the
projects to becompleted quickly in comparison with standard procedures. Therewas
genuine surprise over the rapidity of the release of funds from the DSWD. At the
same time, there was a general sense that the projects were limited in scale and
ameliorating rather than reducing poverty. While it was possible to demonstrate the
impact of lowered transport costs on a bag of produce in terms of an increase in
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value at the market, it was pointed out that the income generated was still
inadequate to cover the farmer’s household’s self-defined needs. Gaps were also
identified in the way that some projects remained unfinished due to inadequate
funds. Hence, the retaining wall in M ulanay lacked earthworks to reinforce it.
Further proposals to establish a ‘‘resort’’ on the foreshore remained a ‘‘dream.’’
In line with observations about the national-scale impacts of the projects, local
informants concurred that there were benefits from the small-scale infrastructure
works. The impacts were modest in terms of poverty alleviation and not necessarily
targeted to the most vulnerable groups within either the villages or towns.
Political Impacts
The evidence concerning political impacts and the exercise of power in planned
participatory processes was similarly uneven.
The implementers themselves acknowledged that the quality of participation
involved in theproject varied considerably (interview, Soliman). They claim, though,
that there were some increases in the exercise of accountability over local oﬃ cials,
while the ideal conditions for participation were rare. Some successes were claimed,
such as with the proportion of the population attending barangay assemblies. This
commenced at a low rate of 27% and is claimed to have increased to reach the
targeted 80% level across the project (DSWD, 2007; interview, R. Lucentales,
Assistant Secretary, Department for Social Welfare and Development, 13 July,
2006). Based on these claims, it would appear that increasing numbers of people did
participate in the process.
However, these measures of success tended to be oﬀ set by other limits to the
processes. The project’s proponents repeatedly emphasised that the aim was to
reduce the role of the mayors in the allocation of discretionary funds for
infrastructure and works. While mayors would be present in barangay assemblies,
decision making was to be devolved to the committees established to oversee
allocation of funds (interview, Parker; interview, Soliman). DSWD staﬀ were
employed to facilitate community-based participatory situation analysis and project
identification. However, NGOs involved in the design of K ALAHI were critical of
this approach, which they regarded as an expansion of the bureaucracy. They saw
themselves as better placed to undertake the analysis and train locals in the process
(interview, Belangel), although this assessment may well be due to disappointment
over lost funding opportunities. National DSWD oﬃ cials also admitted there was
considerable variation in the quality of local facilitators (interview, Lucentales). The
VFG reported similar experiences and commented that their local facilitator was
‘‘trailed’’ by one of the barangay captains. The barangay captain was regarded as
one of the ‘‘mayor’s men’’ who acted as a form of ‘‘broker.’’ He placed pressure on
the staﬀ to speak to some people more than others and explain situations in ways
that reflected favourably upon the mayor. The TVG, on the other hand, regarded
their facilitator as experienced and reported no problems.
Thecoreparticipatory component wastheconvening of fivebarangay assemblies
nominally mandated by the LGC in selected villages to deliberate and vote upon
particular projects (DSWD, n.d.). The barangay assembles would, in turn, elect a
Barangay Development Council. Oﬃ cially, the mayors were to play no formal role
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at thisstage, with theDSWD staﬀ acting asconvenors. Thenational implementersof
K ALAHI conceded that experiences in the field varied considerably. ‘‘Gun-toting’’
mayors, for instance, managed either to intervene directly in the process or to
exercise their influence indirectly (interview, Parker). Another mechanism under-
mining thisprocesswas through the influenceof barangay captains (presidents), who
were, in the words of one VFG member the ‘‘mayor’s men.’’
The TFG and VFG gave contrasting views of the assemblies. In the case of the
VFG, the barangay captains were reportedly able to shape the direction of the
debate by informally establishing a consensus in favour of particular works (in this
instance, a road). The experience in the TFG was somewhat diﬀ erent. The presence
of more articulate and confident small-business owners and teachers drove the
discussion. The consensus was to push for works that protected the viability of
M ulanay (the retaining wall). The World Bank’s own quantitative study also
indicated that barangay captains’ influence was more likely to prevail in villages
where a high proportion of poorer households was less likely to participate in the
initial, village-level processes selecting projects (Labonne and Chase, 2007: 12-13).
Overall, there were many barriers to more eﬀ ective participation by poorer
community members in many places.
Following project identification, the next step involved the mayor convening a
municipal-wide Inter-Barangay Forum comprising three representatives from each
barangay (two elected and the barangay captain) who would vote on the projects
based on merit. Here, the influence of elected oﬃ cials became more overt. Barangay
captains remained represented and were again often perceived as being in the
‘‘mayor’s camp.’’ They could act in concert to win certain projects (interview, F.
Calabazaran, Area Co-ordinator, Buena Vista, Quezon, 28 July 2006). This was
particularly controversial in cases where barangays lost out altogether in having any
of their projects adopted in these fora. M ayors could indirectly resource thecaptains
from ‘‘their barangays’’ (Gonzales, 2006; interview, Lucentales). While there was a
formal grievance process connected to the K ALAHI process, it was not possible to
eliminate all of these practices. There were cases of more thorough obstruction.
According to the TFG and programme staﬀ (interview, Calabazaran), the mayor of
a neighbouring municipality opposed theentireprocess and called on constituents to
boycott it. The medium-term eﬀ ect was a long delay in the delivery of the requested
services and works, although as other municipalities obtained funds, her opposition
was said to have lessened.
The TFG discussion on the day-care centre in M ulanay revealed some additional
insight into the interaction between established power relations and the process.
Participants emphasised that the K ALAHI project meant that day-care services
would be provided for just 50 pesos a month. Yet, many of the savings were
attributable to the low land costs: the centre was built on property that was donated
by the current mayor. This action is politically significant. Both the project staﬀ and
the TFG’s understanding of local political processes reflected the ‘‘clan-based’’
nature of politics. Partisan aﬃ liation is vague and positions tend to bedistributed by
familial relations to by-pass formal term limits (Coronel et al., 2004). They
acknowledged that spending on worksand infrastructurehad traditionally been used
as a basis for ‘‘vote-buying.’’ In an interview with the author, a day-care centre
volunteer acknowledged the nature of the mayor’s ‘‘donation’’ by conceding that
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‘‘people will remember it when the next election happens. But what can we do? Say
no to the land. The process is not perfect.’’
The design of the project was intended to ensure the management of the approved
sub-projects was notionally outside the LGU structures. There was a mixed
perception of how eﬀ ective this was by participants. First, committees were
established, the core of which was the Barangay Sub-Project M anagement
Committee (see DSWD, n.d.: 17). A large amount of auditing and procurement
functions were devolved to community volunteers. Second, the funding mechanism
for the barangay sub-projects was based on the establishment of a community
account with its own treasurer (interview, Calabazaran; interview, Soliman). Some
indication was given of the impacts of these processes in the DSWD’s (Gonzales,
2006) mid-term review. On the one hand, both the DSWD staﬀ and civil society
organisation representatives (92%) agreed that the largest benefit of the project was
its participatory component. Even the mayors (58%) which the project aimed to
reduce the amount of power they had in decision making were in majority
agreement that thiswas thecase. On theother hand, theseresultscontrasted with the
results of barangay-level participants. Only 21% of barangay captains rated the
participatory aspect of the process as valuable. In contrast, it was generally
recognised that the most appreciated gains were the practical ‘‘peer-to-peer’’ skills
acquired and the confidence that this entailed for M unicipal Inter-Barangay
Committee members and local volunteers. The most positive gain, noted by 81%
of the surveyed volunteers, was new skills, such as book keeping, public speaking
and procurement of materials (Gonzales, 2006: 2; interview, Calabazaran).
Similar sentiments were expressed in both focus groups. There was an
appreciation that they were operating to some degree outside the mayor and LGU
oﬃ cials. The volunteers took pride in their role of helping design and implement the
small infrastructure works. They tended to concur that they felt the main gains they
made were in the practical skills identified above and the sense of collective identity
fostered by the projects. They were reluctant to speak in terms of how participation
aﬀ ected the power of the mayors or local political clans. There is, therefore, a
disconnection in how the projects were perceived by diﬀ erent levels of participants.
Although the formal staﬀ and NGOs thought thecommunity-driven process worked
well, most of the base-level participants did not necessarily perceive that this was the
case. The focus groups tended to acknowledge that the ‘‘people in power were still
there . . . although we got some things out of the process.’’ There was limited
evidence in the base-level participants’ comments of these structures being seriously
challenged or overturned.
The extent, therefore, that power relations were challenged or altered according
to either the national-level evaluation or the local informants appears to be quite
limited. Although success was achieved in terms of enacting the barangay assembly
processes, there were ways that established power relations could be accommodated
in the processes.
Security Dimensions
Any consideration of the issues of power relations needs to take into account the
history of violence and conflict on the Bondoc peninsula. Insurgency by the New
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People’s Army (NPA) and landlord resistance to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) had resulted in considerable levels of violence in the area.
There was clearly a palliative element in K ALAHI to many of the sub-projects in
what was a ‘‘post-conflict’’ situation.
The Bondoc peninsula encapsulated many of the main relationships of power in
the Philippines. Although in Luzon and somewhat close to M anila, it was generally
considered ‘‘remote’’ due to poor transport links. Early settlers were able to obtain
considerable landownership concentrations. In-migration was encouraged by these
landlords, especially in the post-World War I I period. Land clearance was
undertaken in return for the right to become tenant farmers growing coconuts
(Franco, 2003). The peninsula became dominated by a small number of
landowning clans who in many cases controlled nominally elected oﬃ cials. One
consequence was that land reform was resisted, despite the establishment of CARP
in 1987.
When CARP was eventually implemented in Bondoc in the late 1990s, it was
violently resisted, with a considerable number of deaths of peasant activists. The
presence of the NPA complicated matters further as its local command allegedly
authorised killings of rival moderate peasant leaders. The area eventually became
militarised between 1998 and 2002 by the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (interview, R. Reyes, Executive Director of
Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Development Services, 21 January 2003).
There was still evidence of this in the province in 2006 when K ALAHI was active.
Both local project staﬀ and focus groups tended to regard the local situation as
being in the aftermath of a period of violence. Project staﬀ emphasised all ‘‘that stuﬀ
[about land ownership conflict] is all over now’’ and redistribution was occurring (as
limited as this is under CARP). The focus groups, in contrast, regarded the
K ALAHI infrastructure as part of the outcome of the period of national
intervention and part of a process of securitisation. Both the local oﬃ cials and
some in the focus groupssaw the infrastructureashelping reduce the influenceof the
NPA in the area and violence carried out by landowners.
Other evidence contrasted with this. There was the admission by one VFG
participant that he was a sympathiser with the National Democratic Front (the
underground political organisation aligned with the NPA). He actually thought the
projects in his village were worthwhile, while declaring that Arroyo was ‘‘still an
enemy of the people.’’ Others conceded that the landowners were ‘‘still here’’ and
doing ‘‘the same things . . . just less of them.’’ The main issues of the conflict
remained unresolved regardlessof theprovision of ameliorativemeasures. K ALAHI
notwithstanding, there was clear evidence that violence and assassinations were
continuing in the area during 2005 and 2006 (Bondoc Solidarity, n.d.).
As the next section will detail, this localised violence reflects a pattern of abuses
against social movement groups and activists, as military and paramilitary groups
felt justified in targeting legal political activists. Although, these were carried out at
‘‘arm’s length’’ from the Arroyo government, there is strong evidence that political
forces supporting the regime were responsible for of these atrocities.
As indicated earlier in this paper, the limited poverty alleviation measures and
increased participation wereclearly intended to help consolidate the legitimacy of the
state in a post-conflict situation. Yet, K ALAHI’s utility in this regard had been
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limited. As will be discussed further below, there are ongoing abuses and the
inequitable social and political relationships remain in place.
Violence, Security, Poverty and the National Polity
These limited impacts on the local scale corresponded to an identifiable social and
political deterioration on the national scale: increasing violence, failing ‘‘govern-
ance’’ and stagnant or rising levels of income poverty/inequality all occurred
between 2002 and 2008.
K ALAHI had explicit goals that linked anti-poverty and security measures. I t has
become increasingly evident, however, that the Arroyo government’s power relied on
processes of violence and political exclusion that K ALAHI nominally aimed to
counter. Having originally come to power on the basis of opposition to the Estrada
government’s alleged corrupt practices, evidence emerged in 2004 that Arroyo’s
husband and son had obtained corrupt fundsfrom theillegal ‘‘jueteng’’ syndicates. The
ousting of the Estrada government had been precipitated by allegations that Estrada
had also received funds from the very same syndicates. ‘‘Jueteng’’ are illegal number
games that operate in most provinces in the Philippines. They generally make ‘‘con-
tributions’’ to local political apparatuses and public projects in return for protection.
M ore important still were revelations that Arroyo was almost certainly involved in
vote-rigging in the 2004 presidential poll (David, 2005). By July 2005, it appeared as
though Arroyo was facing a similar scenario to that which Estrada had experienced in
February 2001, with the government eﬀectively collapsing (Reid, 2006a), yet Arroyo
managed to hold on to power, surviving record levels of unpopularity (see SWS,
various years). A rebel military and civilian combined mass protest eventually dissi-
pated in February 2006 (M elencio, 2006). Arroyo subsequently maintained power by
pointing to the marginally higher than historically average levels of economic growth.
This was combined with a rhetorical emphasis on poverty alleviation and violence.
Indeed, by early 2007, it had also become apparent that the Arroyo government
had been involved in widespread extra-judicial killings and cases of torture. The
primary targets had been activists from legal organisations of the political left and
journalists, with the estimated number of victims ranging from between 100 and 800.
A United Nations Human Rights Council report identified the extent of the
problem. I t argued that Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine National
Police ‘‘orders of battle’’ had eﬀ ectively enabled legal political organisations to be
continually linked to insurgencies. This had legitimated killings by intelligence units
and irregular forces (Alston, 2007). From 2007, the government’s Human Security
Act likewise legitimised indefinite detention (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Human
rights organisations reported cases of torture of 285 persons between 2001 and 2009,
reversing declining incidence in the 1990s (Joint Civil Society Report, 2009). Other
commentators suggest that the inability of the government executive to know of or
take action to stop the violence by government and quasi-government actors
suggests the Philippines exhibits some features of a ‘‘failed state’’ (Doronila, 2007).
While claiming to be committed to improving ‘‘governance,’’ the regime eﬀ ectively
allowed widespread political killings to continue.
A review of national-scale indicators reveals a similar situation with development,
poverty and inequality. Generally, Arroyo’s policies had little positive impact.
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On the one hand, the period between 2002 and 2007 was characterised by
comparatively high levelsof economic growth (all data from World Bank, 2008). The
average annual GDP growth rate in the period was 5.6%. The average annual
growth rate of per capita GDP was 3.5%, rising from US$1015 to US$1216
(constant 2000 US$). There was export growth of 7.5% per year. According to
oﬃ cial estimates, remittances from oﬀ shore labour fell from US$18 million in 2003
to US$15 million in 2005, before rising again to US$20 million in 2006 and 2007.
Growth in government expenditures fell by over 3% in 2002. There was little growth
in these expenditures until 2006 with increased revenue from the expanded value-
added tax (E-VAT). Increased revenue from the E-VAT resulted in 6% growth in
expenditure in 2006 and 9.7% in 2007. In such economic circumstances, it would be
reasonable to expect some reduction in income nationally to complement the local
initiatives of K ALAHI.
Yet, according to the government’s survey data, there was no real reduction in
incomepoverty. First, aswasnoted above, theoﬃ cial poverty estimate (based on the
national-income threshold) for the population as a whole was 33% in 2000. There
was then a decline in poverty incidence to 30% in 2003. By 2006, the oﬃ cial poverty
incidence had risen again to 32.9% (NSCB, 2008). The proportion of families living
below the nationally defined subsistence rose from 10.2 to 11% between 2003 and
2006 (NSCB, 2008). Second, Social Weather Station (2009a) survey data on ‘‘self-
rated poverty’’ and ‘‘hunger’’ suggested a similar situation. The percentage of the
population identifying as ‘‘mahirap’’ (poor) averaged 55% across the period from
2001 to 2009. Although it has been somewhat lower since 2004, it has still averaged
around 50% for the last five years. M ore pronounced patterns existed for self-rated
‘‘hunger’’ and food poverty. General self-rated food poverty levels remained stable
at around 40% between 2004 and 2009, yet themoreextremecategory ‘‘hunger’’ rose
consistently across the same period, from 13% in June 2004 to 23.7% in December
2008 (SWS, 2009a). Other notable factors includea substantial rise in unemployment
from an average of 10% in 2002-03 to over 19% from 2004 to 2008. By February
2009, unemployment had reached a record 34.2% (SWS, 2009b). Third, the GINI
index fell marginally from 46.09 in 2000 to 44.53 in 2003, before rising to 45.8 in 2006
(National Statistics Oﬃ ce (NSO), 2008). The bottom decile’s share of income fell to
1.9%, while theratio of the top 10% to lowest 10% of family incomesrose to over 19
from 16 in 2000 (NSO, 2008).
There are both international and historical-structural factors that account for the
disparity between these macro-economic outcomes and flat or rising poverty rates.
On the one hand, the Philippines is particularly vulnerable to international price
increases for food and petroleum imports. Thewholesale food price index (year 2000
as base 100) rose from 113 in 2001 to over 169 in 2007, corresponding to the rise in
increased ‘‘hunger’’ indicated above. Therewasa strong impact of rises in fuel prices,
with petroleum prices per litre more than doubling from 35 cents in 2002 to 76 cents
in 2007 (World Bank, 2008). On the other hand, part of these price rises was also the
impact of government policies that reflect historical patterns of development. An
additional large part of the price rises was due to the impact of the E-VAT. This rise
in regressive taxation corresponds to an inability or unwillingness of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to confront endemic tax avoidance amongst upper-income earners
(interview, Soliman). This focus on regressive tax measures was a broader indication
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of how the Arroyo government took no substantive action against forms of wealth
accumulation that reflected the predominance of unproductive social classes.
Although the Arroyo government presented itself as acting against ‘‘injustices and
abuses . . . by capitalists, landlords and imperialists’’ (Leyretana, 2003), the pattern
of economic growth and wealth accumulation that emerged during the 2000s shows
little sign of deviation from the past. In terms of other indicators of structural
change, for instance, there was a decline in the share of industrial employment from
15.2% in 2002 to 14.9% in 2006 (World Bank, 2008). However, beyond the scope of
the paper, there are perhaps parallels with the period of immiserising growth during
the M arcos period of the 1970s and 1980s when rising per capita income and export
income had little impact on poverty (see Boyce, 1993). There has been a
demonstrable lack of reduction in poverty or prospects for more industry-led
growth and development. The bulk of gains from growth have been appropriated by
unproductive landowning and renter groups.
The national-scale situation in the Philippines during the K ALAHI period was,
therefore, characterised by uneven and negative impacts on poverty and the
deterioration of the political situation into violence and abuses of power.
Conclusion: Securing Participation and Poverty?
The case of the Philippines suggests that CDD projects implemented during the
Arroyo presidency and implemented with a securitised rationalehavelimited impacts.
Not surprisingly, the international pattern of policy evolution has intersected with
national experiences in ways that have not reduced or alleviated poverty. They have
instead further extended the power of historically embedded political regimes based
on social classes whose power reproduces high levels of poverty.
The paper has utilised a composite theoretical position. The evolution of
development policy making since the 1980s in the form of the WC needs to be
understood in terms of longer-term processes of change in capital accumulation on
an international scale. Political and economic power and policy making has tended
to become increasingly centralised within developing states and depoliticised to use
Hay’s (2007) term through removal from public scrutiny. The impacts of the WC
and its evolution have been uneven: some developing states established enough
autonomy over policy making as argued by Chang (2006) and K iely (2007) to
allow for substantive growth and accumulation. In most contexts, however, there
was the further consolidation of theclass-based regimesof power and states that rely
on politically exclusionary processes of power.
M oreover, the WC has become heavily securitised  as defined by Buzan et al.
(1998) since 2001. The resulting SWC appropriated elements of the PWC such as
forms of governance reform and poverty reduction that did not fundamentally aﬀ ect
relationships of power  and integrated them within a securitised framework.
Poverty alleviation and governance have been increasingly discursively employed as
part of security agendas aimed at protecting the legitimacy of states and populations
from ‘‘existential threats.’’ CDD is one form of project now promoted as part of the
SWC. There is, however, a contradiction implicit in the SWC: the macro-policy
framework of the WC constantly tends either to lead the reinforcement or not to
aﬀ ect substantially the power of exploitative and exclusionary class-based regimes.
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The consequence is that the SWC form of CDD leads to ineﬀ ectual local-based
projects of poverty alleviation.
The Philippines is an exemplary case where the contradictions of the WC have
been expressed on the national scale. The Philippine social formation has deep-
rooted historical and structural relationships based on exploitative social class-based
relationships of power. The Philippine polity, while nominally a constitutional
democracy, was characterised by competition between elite clans and their interests.
The power of these classes has its origins in and has tended to rely on international
bases of support. One recent expression of this has been the ideational dominance of
the WC in the Philippines, especially since the early 1980s. These policies have,
however, done little to facilitate growth or reduce the entrenched power of the main
political clans. On the contrary, the bias towards export-orientated production in
agriculture has arguably consolidated their power.
The influence of the SWC has overwhelmingly resulted in the continuity of these
historical trends. The SWC’s emergence in thePhilippines corresponded to a cycleof
political crises. The Arroyo government emerged as a result of mass protests and
disillusionment with the Estrada regime. The Arroyo regime, therefore, portrayed
itself as a centrist and reforming government. K ALAHI emerged as a ‘‘flagship’’
project aimed at ‘‘governance’’ reform and poverty alleviation. The rationale for
K ALAHI, however, was heavily securitised. The project was presented as a response
to the dual threat of insurgencies and abuses carried out by state-based and elite
actors. The target became LGU functionaries and their misuse of discretionary
funds, yet the substantive focus of development strategy and economic policy
remained within the guidelines of the WC and depoliticised. There was no
substantive attempt to enact forms of structural change that could lead to sustained
transformation and poverty alleviation.
Instead, the outcomes of both the general development policies of the Arroyo
government and K ALAHI were limited and in somecasesnegative. First, the limited
scope of K ALAHI  with just US$200 million funding and its implementation
through a marginal government department  largely ensured that the flagship
poverty project had marginal impact. This was particularly so as social expenditures
were either flat or declining for much of the period.
Second and unsurprisingly, the local impacts in terms of poverty alleviation were
weak. Some modest infrastructure projects were completed, often with greater speed
and eﬃ ciency owing to reduced transaction costs from participation by project
volunteers. There was some sense of ‘‘ownership’’ and appreciation expressed in the
focus groups and mid-term reviews. However, focus group participants and local
implementers were clear that the extent of poverty alleviation was limited.
Third, ‘‘governance’’ impacts were small. Some successes were registered with
formal levels of participation through the convening of barangay assemblies and
various project committees. The quality of the process varied with the quality of
DSWD personnel and the co-operation of local authorities. M ayors and their
networks of power still found a way to influence the processes and in some cases
continue with ‘‘vote-buying’’ dispersals of resources.
Fourth, with the ‘‘security’’ eﬀ ects, local participants understood that infra-
structure was linked to purported attempts at reducing incidences of political
violence. Yet, violence, including the deaths and kidnappings of farmer activists,
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continued. The activists from the so-called illegal insurgency-based group did not
see the provision of ameliorative measures as reducing the need for social and
political struggle.
Fifth, on a national scale, even these impacts were overshadowed by a
deterioration in political conditions and ‘‘security.’’ The combination of widespread
kidnappings and murders of activists and journalists and strong evidence that the
Arroyo regime is itself involved in corruption and electoral fraud all indicate that
insecurity is not merely a reflection of poverty. Violence has become a routine as
formal security policy increasingly blurs the distinction between activists and armed
insurgencies. They are endemic features of the Philippine polity and social class
dynamics of rule, of which the Arroyo regime is an intrinsic part.
Sixth, the national situation regarding development and poverty has either not
improved or declined. There is no evidence of sustained growth and transformation
that could reduce income poverty. While there was some level of consistent growth
between 2002 and 2008, rising inequality suggests that the main benefits did not
flow to the poor. On the contrary, food and fuel price rises and increases in
indirect taxation actually resulted in the growth of income poverty between 2003
and 2006.
These outcomes suggest a number of factors about the SWC and its impacts on
participatory development practice. The SWC’s focus on poverty and governance
had limited impacts due to the inadequate understanding of power and the deep-
rooted problems that must be confronted in most developing-country contexts. The
SWC has compounded these problems by linking poverty alleviation eﬀ orts to
security and anti-insurgency-based practices. The regimes such as Arroyo’s that
carry these measures out, however, have historically relied on violence and abuses
against populations as forms of rule. The main results are token eﬀ orts at
governance reform and poverty alleviation  often in the local sphere  while
national poverty and political situations continue to deteriorate. Unless these deep-
rooted problems are confronted directly, local eﬀ orts at participation are likely to
remain ineﬀ ectual at best.
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